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Of all the modern philosophers who tried to overcome matters of fact, 
Whitehead is the only one who, instead of taking the path of critique and 
directing his attention away from facts to what makes them possible as Kant 
did; or adding something to their bare bones as Husserl did; or avoiding the 
fate of their domination, their Gestell, as much as possible as Heidigger did; 
tried to get closer to them or, more exactly, to see through them the reality 
that requested a new respectful realist attitude (Latour 2004a: 244). 
 
This is the problem for Bruno Latour: that, in order to explore their conditions of 
possibility, science studies scholars in the end seem to have taken facts too much for 
granted and have assumed to know too well in advance what they are. In so doing, 
the facts that 'everyone else' could kick at, or bang on, or sit down on seemed to 
disintegrate in their hands. This is the ironic conclusion, for '[t]he question was never 
to get away from facts but closer to them' (Latour 2004a: 231). 
 
In this article I want to explore some of the sometimes different, sometimes 
overlapping ways in which the reality of facts is understood by Bruno Latour, Isabelle 
Stengers, Alfred North Whitehead, and Gilles Deleuze. My intentions here are not at 
all to produce an exhaustive survey, or to come up with an ideal synthesis of these 
theorists' work in this area, nor is it to 'compare and contrast' them. Instead, the 
argument in this chapter folds, unfolds and refolds around these authors with the aim 
of exploring what their different concepts, or what the same concepts differently 
inflected, can do. I want to ask where a few key terms - among them, relationality, 
exteriority, potentiality and virtuality - might lead, and how they might be made to 
matter. The discussion will be dominated by two attractors.1 The first is event, the 
second is ethics.  
 
Event has been used by many theorists - far more than I will refer to below - as a way 
of contesting the concept of bare fact which often dominates mechanistic (and 
common sense) accounts of the world. An event in this context is not just something 
that happens. As a philosophical concept, it exists in relation to a specific set of 
problems, including the problem of how to conceive of modes of individuation that 
pertain not to being, or to essences and representation, but to becoming and 
effectivity. In this respect event-thinking can be understood to be part of an anti-
reductionist project that seeks to describe the relations between actual things, bodies, 
and happenings and the independent reality of these events in themselves. It is thus 
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an especially relevant concept with regards to the problematisation of knowledge, 
and in particular to the philosophy of science.  
 
Any discussion of the concept of event necessarily involves addressing far more than 
bare fact. In the first parts of this chapter, I explore how this concept aids Whitehead 
in his critique of the bifurcation of nature and, in particular, its role in Whitehead's, 
Latour's and Stengers' critique of the bifurcated relations between subjects and 
objects, primary and secondary qualities, and facts and values, as these relations are 
often dramatised in the ideal of modern science. Having established, at some length, 
the use that these theorists make of event, I then push the analysis further by 
examining some of the implications of event-thinking in relation not only to scientific 
facts, but also to value/s and ethics. Of course this approach to ethics, via science, is 
not the only way to address the issue. Indeed, the limitations of the bifurcation of 
nature into facts and values that subtends much scientific thinking - in science as well 
as in other fields, such as economics (see for example Putnam 2004) - and the 
implications of that bifurcation for ethics are, and perhaps always have been, 
particularly noticeable. Ethical value is just as often (if not more often) identified, for 
instance, with the creativity of 'life itself' and not solely with values that are perceived 
to be imposed upon life. It is precisely because modern science claims a privileged 
relation to the facts of life however (and on this basis, its own privilege with regards 
to conceptions of the world) that I find it an especially fertile point of entry to value, 
and from there, to ethics. And indeed, the relation between ethics and science - or 
more specifically, the relation of ethics to science - is a live and contested 
contemporary issue, as the burgeoning debates and critiques in and around bioethics 
suggest. At a gathering of scholars working in the field of science studies (4S and 
EASST, Public Proofs: Science, Technology and Democracy, Paris 2004), pleas were 
made for an engagement with the role and place of ethics in social scientific studies of 
science to begin in earnest (for example Mol 2004).  
 
Although my point of entry to ethics proceeds via science and turns, in large part, on 
Latour's and Stengers' different takes on Whitehead's notion of the bifurcation of 
nature, I should also add that there are themes in Whitehead's work that are rarely 
addressed by these two theorists, but which are more fully developed by Deleuze. I 
am thinking in particular of the points of resonance between Whitehead's concept of 
potentiality and Deleuze's concept of virtuality which, I will argue, differ considerably 
from Latour's notion of exteriority. It is by way of Deleuze's conception of the relation 
between the virtual and the actual, a relation which also informs his understanding of 
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the relation between problems and solutions, that I am able to further explore the 
implications of event-thinking for ethics in ways that are relevant, but not exclusively 
so, to science. Indeed, in the final two sections of this chapter, I want to consider why 
it might be important for social scientists to attend not only to the actual domain but 
also to the virtual. Firstly, because the concept of the virtual, in challenging the 
assumption that the social is the only valid level of explanation, extends critiques of 
social constructionist accounts of science; and secondly, because this concept also 
provides a reason, a reason which is immanent to 'concrete fact', for asking about 
value. In this respect, as I will argue, it further develops an ethics of social science 
research. My intentions in this paper, then, are somewhat different to sociological 
critiques of ethics (and especially critiques of the style of ethical reasoning that is 
typical of a certain Anglo-American philosophy), of the 'ethicalisation process' (Barry 
2004), and of bioethics (Evans 2002). Such studies are especially welcome in view of 
the increasingly important role that ethics is called upon to play in the contemporary 
scientific, technological, and especially biomedical, landscape. Nevertheless, in this 
chapter I want to make a positive argument for ethics, and to suggest that the concept 
of the event, augmented by the concept of the virtual, is useful in this task. 
 
Prehension, relationality, reality 
As Philip Rose explains: 'an absolute key to understanding Whitehead's work is the 
fallibility and revisability of his metaphysical scheme. Whitehead's attempt to 
develop a system of metaphysics should thus be seen not as a final statement 
concerning the nature of things, but rather as part of a larger ongoing historical 
project' (Rose 2002: 2). Necessarily so, for Whitehead was concerned not only with 
what he calls 'speculative metaphysics' – which addresses itself to the necessary 
conditions for the possibility of existence - but also with cosmology, with 'the 
contingent conditions of "things" as they happen to be' (Rose 2002: 3). One of the 
key contingencies installed by modern science, as far as Whitehead is concerned, is 
the 'bifurcation of nature' into subjects and objects and, relatedly, primary and 
secondary qualities. 'The sensationalist doctrine', as he calls it, rests on two 
problematic assumptions. In the first instance, it assumes that sense-data does no 
more than signal (if it even manages that) to its existence. Passive and mute, it 
contributes nothing to meaning. The second dimension (the 'subjectivist principle') 
assumes that these inert facts are qualified and given meaning by a subject (a human 
mind, say) who organises them according to a universal principle, such as rationality 
or morality.  
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 Nevertheless, despite the 'genius' of the seventeenth century, and the 'continued work 
of clearance' conducted in the eighteenth century, not everyone, Whitehead argues, 
accepts the opposition that underpins scientific realism (Whitehead 1985: 95). It is in 
English literature in particular that Whitehead finds representatives of 'the intuitive 
refusal seriously to accept the abstract materialism of science' (Whitehead 1985: 106) 
and, especially, the divorce of nature from value. His own aim therefore is to build a 
system of thought in which aesthetic value (for example) is as much a part of nature 
as is the mechanism of matter. For Whitehead, natural philosophy - and this well-
known quote is cited in Latour's article in Critical Inquiry (2004a) - 'may not pick up 
and choose. For us the red glow of the sunset should be as much a part of nature as 
are the molecules and electric waves by which men of science would explain the 
phenomenon' (Latour 2004a: 244). 
 
The complex historical genesis of the bifurcation of nature into primary and 
secondary qualities has been described, by Whitehead as well as by others, from a 
number of different angles (see for example Proctor 1991). In The Concept of Nature 
however, Whitehead lays considerable emphasis on the part played by the systematic 
establishment of theories of light and sound in the seventeenth century, and in 
particular the connection that Newton made between light and colour. These 
transmission theories, as Whitehead calls them, put an end to 'the sweet simplicity' of 
'the concept of matter as the substance whose attributes we perceive' (Whitehead 
1920: 26) and dislodged the epistemological confidence that observation once 
guaranteed. For while a colour may be perceived to be an attribute of matter, 'in fact' 
it is not. A gap thus opens up in western philosophy and science between what seems 
to be (what is experienced by the subject) and what is (what is known as a fact), 
between the redness and the warmth of the fire on the one hand, and the conjectured 
system of agitated molecules of carbon and oxygen on the other. One of the principal 
aims of Whitehead's concept of nature is to address both the object of perception 
(which is the task that the philosophy of science set itself), as well as the perceiver 
and the process, and the histories of their relations. For if these entities are not 
understood to be related to each other, then as Whitehead (taking the scientific 
neglect of aesthetic value to its logical conclusion) wryly notes:  
 
nature gets credit for what should in truth be reserved for ourselves: the rose 
for its scent: the nightingale for his song: and the sun for his radiance. The 
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poets are entirely mistaken. They should address their lyrics to themselves, 
and should turn them into odes of self-congratulation on the excellency of the 
human mind. Nature is a dull affair, soundless, scentless, colourless; merely 
the hurrying of material, endlessly, meaninglessly (Whitehead 1985: 68-69). 
 
The concept of nature, therefore, must refer to everything that 'we observe in 
perception through the senses' (Whitehead 1920: 3). It must refer, as Isabelle 
Stengers says, not just to 'what we perceive and can identify, but [to] the whole 
indefinite complexity of what we are aware of, even if we have no words to name it' 
(Stengers 1999: 197). I will be returning to this point in due course. 
 
In an attempt to avoid the bifurcation of nature into subjects and objects and to 
illustrate instead their connectedness, Whitehead defines all things, or what he calls 
'actual entities' or 'actual occasions', in terms of their relatedness. This is what an 
actual entity is in Whitehead's metaphysical system: a coalition into something 
concrete, a novel concrescence (or becoming), of relatedness or prehensions. 
Whitehead often calls prehensions 'feelings,' although they are not emotions in any 
conventional sense, are not psychological, nor are they necessarily even associated 
with human subjects. Instead, prehension might be better understood as a process of 
unifying. It is by way of prehension, by way of processes of unification, that all actual 
entities and societies of actual entities come into existence. 'Feelings are variously 
specialized operations,' Whitehead writes, 'effecting a transition into subjectivity. … 
An actual entity is a process, and is not describable in terms of the morphology of a 
"stuff"' (Whitehead 1978: 40-41). Nature is a complex not of 'things' per se, but of 
prehensive unifications. Importantly, the unity to which Whitehead refers is not 
given in a subject, a human mind, in consciousness, or in cognition, but is rather 
'placed in the unity of an event' (Whitehead 1985: 114). Whitehead's prehensive 
unities 'precede' the bifurcation of nature not only into subject and object, but also 
into primary and secondary qualities. For this reason, the concept of subjective value 
also undergoes a radical transformation: '"Value"', Whitehead writes, 'is the word I 
use for the intrinsic reality of an event … Realisation is in itself the attainment of 
value' (Whitehead 1985: 116). 
 
Rather than pursue the implications of Whitehead's concepts of the event and of 
value now, I want to pause momentarily to consider some of the points of resonance 
between his and Isabelle Stengers' and Bruno Latour's understandings of reality, 
particularly insofar as they too privilege relationality (to a more or less radical 
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degree). For instance: in her discussion of the notion of discovery in The Invention of 
Modern Science Stengers describes the reality of America in terms that bear a 
striking similarity to the interwoven prehensions that are grasped and grasp 
themselves together in a unity: '[w]hat other definition can we give to the reality of 
America, than that of having the power to hold together a disparate multiplicity of 
practices, each and every one of which bears witness, in a different mode, to the 
existence of what they group together' (Stengers 2000: 97). Although Stengers' use of 
the notion of practices might be likened to Whitehead's emphasis on different modes 
of becoming (modes of becoming that will shape an entity's mode of achievement in 
its specificity), in fact, using a rather more Latourian vocabulary, she suggests that it 
is not the sheer number of witnesses that contributes to the reality of an entity such 
as America, but rather their heterogeneity: 'If the allies belong to a homogenous class, 
the stability of the reference only holds for a single type of test. America affirms its 
existence prior to the discovery of Columbus by the multiplicity of tests to which 
those who define their practice in reference to it have subjected it' (Stengers 2000: 
97).  
 
This is an 'answer' then - an answer which I will be explicating in more detail below in 
relation to Stengers' understanding of the concept of an event - to the question as to 
whether America existed prior to its 'discovery', or whether 'the ferments (of the 
microbes)', in one of Latour's examples, 'exist[ed] before Pasteur' (Latour 1999: 147). 
It is the kind of question that haunts critiques, and especially constructionist 
critiques, of science and of the status of scientific objects (are they real? are they 
representations?) precisely because science aims 'at things that the passing of time 
cannot "make equal"' (Stengers 2000: 39). How can historians, Stengers ask, 'not 
think, like the rest of us, that the Earth revolves around the Sun'? (Stengers 2000: 
41). And yet, she continues, the conception of reality in terms of bearing witness 
demands that the earth and the sun and the revolutions be understood to be 
absolutely specific to - and therefore contingent upon - the relations that constitute 
them. '[W]hoever doubts the existence of the Sun would have stacked against him or 
her not only the witness of astronomers and our everyday experience, but also the 
witness of our retinas, invented to detect light, and the chlorophyll of plants, invented 
to capture its energy' (Stengers 2000: 97.8). Insofar as an entity is dependent upon 
relationality, upon its interconnectedness with other entities, its permanence - or 
endurance, as Whitehead puts it - cannot be guaranteed.   
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Latour ties, helpfully I think, the problem of historicity to the bifurcation of nature 
into subjects and objects. The problem with the subject/object dichotomy, he writes, 
is that subjects and objects 'cannot share history equally' (Latour 1999: 149, emphasis 
omitted): 'Pasteur's statement may have a history - it appears in 1858 and not before 
- but the ferment cannot have such a history since it either has always been there or 
has never been there' (Latour 1999: 149). Herein, for him, lies the usefulness of the 
concept of an event: 
 
EVENT: A term borrowed from Whitehead to replace the notion of discovery 
and its very implausible philosophy of history (in which the object remains 
immobile while the human historicity of the discoverers receives all the 
attention). Defining the experiment as an event has consequences for the 
historicity of all the ingredients, including nonhumans, that are the 
circumstances of that experiment (see concrescence) (Latour 1999: 306). 
 
Rather than concede to the idea of bare and mute facts that lie waiting to be 
discovered by the active human agent and in order, instead, to grant activity to both 
actors and actants, Latour explores the associations and substitutions - that is, the 
connections and replacements - that occur between them as they come into existence. 
Reality is extracted, in Latour's terms, 'not from a one-to-one correspondence 
between an isolated statement and a state of affairs, but from the unique signature 
drawn by associations and substitutions through the conceptual space' (Latour 1999: 
161-162). An entity does not secure a fixed ontological position by passing into an 
extrahistorical dimension. Rather, Latour is 'able to talk calmly about relative 
existence' (Latour 1999: 156), 'to define existence not as an all-or-nothing concept but 
as a gradient' (Latour 1999: 310). Both subjects and objects, or more accurately 
propositions, are characterised by a dynamic historicity, where historicity refers not 
simply to the moment of representation ('our contemporary "representation" of 
microorganisms dates from the mid-nineteenth century') or to evolution ('the 
ferments "evolve over time"'), but to 'the whole series of transformations that make 
up the reference' (Latour 1999: 145, 146 and 150). Each transformation defines an 
entity in its singularity: just as Whitehead claims that 'an electron within a living 
body is different from the electron outside it' (Stengers 1999: 202), so Latour 
suggests that '"air" will be different when associated with "Rouen" and "spontaneous 
generation" than when associated with "rue d'Ulm," "swan-neck experiment," and 
"germs"' (Latour 1999: 161). 
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Another, perhaps more technical, way of putting this would be to argue, as 
Whitehead does, that '[t]here is a becoming of continuity, but no continuity of 
becoming' (Whitehead 1978: 35). One of the implications of this claim is that it 
disputes the finality of those explanations of the world that 'privilege the continuity of 
the functions or patterns on which they depend' (Stengers 2002: 252) - a point that 
extends not only to tangible entities in the world, but also to space and to time. For 
Whitehead, once again, the recourse to time and space as a means of unifying nature 
– for example the claim that the redness of the fire and the agitation of the molecules 
occur at the same time and in the same space – cannot suffice as an explanation for it 
demands that time and space be apprehended independently of the happenings that 
occur in time, or of the objects that occupy space. Whitehead argues instead that, 
along with subjects and objects, space and time are also reified entities that are to be 
explained by the contingent and changing events from which they are abstracted.2 An 
enduring entity - such as a molecule - does not move through time and space and nor 
do changes occur in space and time. Instead, motion and change are attributable to 
the differences between successive events, each with their own durations. 
 
Insofar as it is extensiveness which becomes (and not becoming which is extensive) 
there is, as Stengers points out, a strong contrast between the values of experimental 
science and of speculative philosophy: one is 'for' being and the other is 'for' 
becoming (Stengers 2002: 252-253). Indeed Stengers argues that the atomicity of 
time was precisely the price, 'the speculative price', that had to be paid 'in order for 
philosophy to define itself "for" becoming' (Stengers 2002: 252). This does not mean 
however that the purpose of speculative philosophy is to act as a corrective, nor is it 
to devalue what scientists value (continuity, for instance). When Whitehead criticizes 
scientific method on the basis of the experiences that it fails to include, when he asks 
what it is that Wordsworth finds in nature that 'failed to receive expression in 
science', he does so, he underscores, 'in the interest of science itself; for one main 
position in these lectures is a protest against the idea that the abstractions of science 
are irreformable and unalterable' (Whitehead 1985: 103). 
 
Although Whitehead might certainly have wanted to reform and alter scientific 
abstractions, it is arguable that his own level of abstraction and technicality makes 
his work difficult to translate in to anything other than a most general political 
programme. On the other hand, it may be precisely this 'difficulty' that enables 
Whitehead's work to be such a rich and influential resource for other critics.3 There is 
no question for example, as I will be discussing below, of the impact of Whitehead's 
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approach (or perhaps more specifically, of the impact of a Stengers-Whitehead 
approach) on the expressly political - and indeed ethical - project that Latour outlines 
in Politics of Nature. Before beginning to address this project, I want to consider the 
way that Stengers deploys the concept of an event in order to re-conceive of the very 
relation between science and politics.   
 
Politics, science 
The concept of the event is crucial in the context of Stengers' critique of scientists and 
of critics of science for it offers a route out of 'the black hole' in which both parties, 
Stengers argues, often find themselves. The reason that they do so, she writes, is 
because scientists 
 
if asked to explain, would describe the 'different from all other practices' in 
terms of privilege, and would distinguish science from other collective 
practices said to be stamped with subjectivity, instruments for the pursuit of 
different interests, guided by values that pose an obstacle to truth. Objectivity, 
neutrality, truth - all these terms, when used to characterize the singularity of 
the sciences, transform this singularity into a privilege. And this privilege, 
which confers on the sciences a position of judgement in relation to other 
collective practices, is also what the critics gathered together in the black hole 
transform, in their own way, into an instrument of judgement against the 
sciences (Stengers 1997: 133-134).  
 
It is not enough, for Stengers, for critics of science to draw attention to the ways in 
which this 'ideally' value-free discipline is 'in fact' riddled with various political, 
economic and other investments. Similarly, the claim that science is a social 
undertaking like any other (and here Stengers is undoubtedly referring to some of 
Latour's and other science studies scholars' early work) is problematic not only 
because it flattens science out and renders it equivalent to all other knowledges and 
practices - not 'different from all other practices' after all - but also because it 
establishes sociology as 'a superscience, the science that explains all others' (Stengers 
2000: 3). For Stengers, the challenge is to respect the singularity of the sciences, 
without at the same time conceding to the perceived opposition between rationality 
on the one hand and 'illusion, ideology, and opinion' on the other (Stengers 1997: 
134): 'Political engagement', she writes, 'is a choice, and not the result of a 
disappointment linked to the discovery of the political dimension of the practices that 
reason was supposed to regulate' (Stengers 2000: 59).  
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 Rather than define science in opposition to politics, Stengers redefines politics. Or 
more accurately, she offers a definition of politics in terms of cosmopolitics. Her debt 
to Whitehead, in the following explanation of this term, is clear: 
 
[t]he prefix 'cosmo' takes into account that the word common should not be 
restricted to our fellow humans, as politics since Plato has implied, but should 
entertain the problematic togetherness of the many concrete, heterogeneous, 
enduring shapes of value that compose actuality, thus including beings as 
disparate as 'neutrinos' (a part of the physicist's reality) and ancestors (a part 
of the reality for those whose traditions have taught them to communicate 
with the dead) (Stengers 2002: 248). 
 
According to this definition, modern science is political through and through not on 
account of its 'extra-rational' investments but because it has invented a new mode of 
'togetherness', one which, specifically, problematises the relation between fact and 
fiction. Rather than understand this new 'use of reason' in terms of scientific 
discovery or progress, Stengers puts it under the sign of the event. The Gallilean 
event, she writes, was 
 
capable of doing what it was no longer believed possible to do, celebrating the 
statements that lightheartedly cross the distance between 'nature' and 
polished balls rushing down a smooth, inclined plane. What is presented as 
having been reconquered in principle, if not (still) in fact, is precisely 
something one believed to have been lost: the power to make nature speak, 
that is, the power of assessing the difference between 'its' reasons and those of 
the fictions so easily created about it (Stengers 2000: 80).4 
 
At its most minimal an event, for Stengers, is the creator of a difference between a 
before and an after. Crucially however, it is not the event itself which is the bearer of 
signification. Instead, all those who are touched by an event define and are defined by 
it, whether they are aligned with or opposed to it. In her words (and note how in 
keeping this description is with her conception of reality):  
 
[An event] has neither a privileged representative nor legitimate scope. The 
scope of the event is part of its effects, of the problem posed in the future it 
creates. Its measure is the object of multiple interpretations, but it can also be 
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measured by the very multiplicity of these interpretations: all those who, in 
one way or another, refer to it or invent a way of using it to construct their 
own position, become part of the event's effects. … Only indifference 'proves' 
the limits of the scope of the event (Stengers 2000: 66-67). 
 
Indifference: feeling's own contrast. And yet the notion of an event is a provocation to 
feeling precisely insofar as it signals that something matters - that something has 
produced a variation, or made a difference - without specifying what that something 
is, or to whom or to what it will matter. It is impossible to draw up a list of the 
entities that enter an event in advance because identities and relations acquire 
definition through it.5 Not only does the event not have a privileged representative 
therefore (science is not the domain of scientists alone), it is also impossible for any 
participant in an event, by definition, to stand outside of it and to pass judgement on 
it, or to explain it away with reference to a history, culture, or geographical area. As 
Stengers puts it: 'No account can have the status of explanation, conferring a logically 
deducible character to the event, without falling into the classic trap of giving to the 
reasons that one discovers a posteriori the power of making it occur, when, in other 
circumstances, they would have had no such power' (Stengers 1997: 216). Latour 
explicates this point about causality further: '[n]ot only should science studies abstain 
from using society to account for nature or vice versa, it should also abstain from 
using causality to explain anything. Causality follows from events and does not 
precede them' (Latour 1999: 152). 
 
The above discussion has begun to address the ways in which the concept of event, as 
it is used by Whitehead, and to a greater or lesser degree by Stengers and Latour, can 
be mobilised as part of an anti-reductionist project that seeks to challenge the notion 
of bare and ahistorical facts, the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, 
and the opposition between subjects and objects. If subjects and objects cannot be 
assumed to exist prior to the event, and thus cannot claim any general validity, then 
the question of their existence and the nature of their identity and of their relations 
(their relation of opposition for example), is no longer a philosophical one but, 
rather, a matter for practical investigation (Stengers 2000: 132-133). To argue thus is 
not to undermine or disrespect the achievements of science - be they methodological, 
epistemological, or ontological - but rather to recognise the specificity of those 
achievements and the practices, risks, and responsibility which enable them. This in 
itself serves to displace their privilege. As Stengers puts it: '"Science is different from 
all other practices!"' For many scientists, this is a heartfelt cry, a cry that needs to be 
 12
heard, even if we remain free not to understand it exactly in the way that those who 
utter it would like' (Stengers 1997: 133, my emphasis).  
 
For Whitehead, as I have already noted, the singularity of an entity is derived from a 
multiplicity of diverse elements that are inextricably conjoined not by relations of 
cause and effect in space and time but by way of prehensive relations grasped in the 
unity of an event. One of the important implications of this point is that it displaces 
the need for any additional - or perhaps Whitehead would say any arbitrary - term to 
be introduced in order to explain the relations between things. Consider, for example, 
his critique of the Newton's laws of motion:  
 
the notion of stresses, as essential connections between bodies, was a 
fundamental factor in the Newtonian concept of nature. … But [Newton] left 
no hint why, in the nature of things, there should be any stresses at all. The 
arbitrary motions of the bodies were thus explained by the arbitrary stresses 
between material bodies … By introducing stresses … [Newton] greatly 
increased the systematic aspect of Nature. But he left all the factors of the 
system … in the position of detached facts devoid of any reason for their 
compresence. He thus illustrated a great philosophic truth, that a dead Nature 
can give no reasons (Whitehead 1938: 184).  
 
This critique has much contemporary relevance. One might consider its implications, 
for example, with respect to debates that address the usefulness, or not, of analytical 
terms such as 'the social', 'the natural', or 'discourse'. Some of the frustration that 
often surrounds the use of these terms can be put down to the recognition that they 
are abstractions which, as such, cannot do the work of explanation: it is they 
themselves that instead require explanation. Hence Latour's suggestion, cited above, 
that 'science studies abstain from using society to account for nature or vice versa'. It 
is not surprising that Latour should advise his reader thus, for he is part of a 
sociological sub-discipline that has situated itself against grand narratives and 
reifying concepts and which has, as Adrian Mackenzie (specifically in relation to 
SCOT) notes, 'stayed within localized sites, seeking to trace the social with an ever 
more fine-grained focus' (Mackenzie 2005: 4). This is a valuable project, especially 
insofar as it draws attention to the singularity of each and every situation, a 
singularity which is not reducible to the individual components that can be identified 
within it, but is rather to be found in the unique combination of those components in 
a specific context.  
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 Having said that, there are arguably two key problems with this focus on the local, 
especially when it is pursued in isolation from any other conceptual construction. In 
the first instance, to concentrate on the specificity of the context does not in itself 
address the issue of how such components are connected beyond their circumstantial 
togetherness. Nature bifurcates: there is the togetherness, and there are the 
circumstances that led to it. Secondly, while it may be the case that 'concrete fact', as 
Whitehead would put it, 'is the only reason' and cannot therefore be explained with 
reference to another term (stresses, in Whitehead's example, society, in Latour's), it is 
also important to account for what Mackenzie calls 'the overflow', that is, the 'feeling 
or affect [that] overflows particular localities' (Mackenzie 2005: 4). I want to pursue 
these issues - in essence, becoming and virtuality - in the following section of this 
chapter, specifically in relation to the problem of ethics, and then go on in conclusion 
to suggest that the concept of virtuality is also useful in further extending Latour's 
critique of 'additional' - or 'arbitrary', as Whitehead might put it - analytical terms in 
the social sciences. For if a dead Nature can give no reasons, as Whitehead claims, 
then it seems important, with regards to ethics, to explore what vital reasons there 
might be for focusing on value, as well as concrete fact, in social science research.   
 
Exteriority, potentiality 
Conventionally, ethics concerns the application of moral principle to concrete social 
facts. To simplify in the crudest fashion, this understanding of ethics often rests, 
more or less explicitly, on the bifurcation of nature into subjects (who are active, 
moral, and able to conceive of and establish value) and objects (which are passive, 
mute and indifferent, and which usually have no call on value at all). Clearly, this 
conception is a problem in the context of Whitehead's speculative metaphysics. In the 
first instance, as I have already noted, this is because Whitehead understands all 
entities to be constituted by way of their bonds or relations with the world. Thus the 
distinction between subjects and objects which subtends ethics, as it is usually 
understood, is impossible to uphold; indeed, it is impossible to conceive of any entity 
in the world being independent or autonomous from the world. As I mentioned 
briefly earlier, Whitehead further argues that all relations are value-relations. This is 
how all real or actual relations (entities) are to be defined: by the value of their 
relations. Values, in other words, do not exist outside of, or beyond, relations/things; 
they are neither brought to them, nor can they be separated from them. Instead, an 
entity is the source of values for other entities, and is the centre of values felt. 
Valuative relations, being affected, is a necessary condition of existence. Values are 
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'part of the very "matter" of fact - part of the very fabric of "things" in and of 
themselves' (Rose 2002: 2). This redefinition of the relation between facts and value 
is a particularly challenging one with regards to the question of ethics for it suggests 
that all entities (regardless of their definition as subjects or objects) 'have' - or, 
strictly speaking, are - value. How then is it possible to adopt a normative position 
with regards to such entities, and their relations? 
 
These are issues which trouble Latour, often very explicitly, in his book Politics of 
Nature (2004b). Latour's agenda here is to rehabilitate political ecology through a 
detailed analysis (and rejection) of the concept of nature, where nature is understood 
not in terms of a domain of reality, but as a particular function of politics (Latour 
2004b: 133). For Latour, nature in the 'old regime' serves to make political assembly 
and the convening of the collective (associations of humans and nonhumans) 
impossible. One of the ways in which it does this, he suggests, is by distributing the 
capacities of speech and representation along the lines of facts and values. 
Interestingly, Latour does not seek to critique this situation by dislodging the 
fact/value distinction, or even by conflating facts and values. Instead, he attempts to 
replace the vocabulary that describes facts and values, and to reco-ordinate the axes 
on which they turn.  
 
I do not wish to rehearse the details of Latour's position, which is comprehensively 
laid out in his chapter on this subject (2004b, see especially chapter three). It is 
important to note at the outset however that Latour is, for the most part, concerned 
with propositions - literally, pro-positions, the movement and process prior to the 
point at which an entity becomes 'natural' (i.e. a 'position'), that is, a full-fledged 
member of the collective. With regards to this process of 'naturalisation', Latour 
begins by drawing up a list of requirements that any replacement of the terms facts 
and values must meet, and reorganizes these requirements under two headings (or 
houses, as he calls them): the 'power to take in account: how many are we?' (which is 
the task of the upper house) and the 'power to arrange in rank order: can we live 
together?' (which is the task of the lower house). The key point about this 
reorganization of public life is that by laying out the stages by which a candidate for 
existence becomes natural, Latour seeks to extend 'due process', to extend and enroll 




Unlike in the old constitution then, where the definition of nature required that facts 
be established before values are introduced, we all (and this 'we' includes nonhumans 
as well as humans) participate in the tasks of the two houses, where some of these 
tasks refer to questions of fact, and some to questions of value. So far, so 
unsurprising. If Latour's life work can be characterized as an exploration of the 
lengthy and complex ways in which facts are made, created, fabricated, and invented, 
of the ways in which they are not given in the common world, then the idea that 
ethical questions are to be raised only after the facts have been established is bound 
to be a matter for critique. For Latour, it cannot be possible to build the best of 
possible worlds when the question of values (the common good) is separated from 
the question of facts (the common world). He argues instead that these questions 
must be conjoined - as the term 'the good common world', which Latour claims is 
synonymous with Stengers's 'cosmos', indicates (Latour 2004b: 93). The shift that 
Latour proposes, from the 'the normative requirement from foundations to the 
details of the deployment of matters of concern' (Latour 2004b: 118), is arguably not 
a pushing-aside of ethics but rather an extension of it to all who/that are involved in 
world-making. In his words: 'All our requirements have the form of an imperative. In 
other words, they all involve the question of what ought to be done. … The question 
of what ought to be, as we can see now, is not a moment in the process; rather, it is 
coextensive with the entire process (Latour 2004b: 125).  
 
While Latour's position is not identical with Whitehead's (as will I be discussing 
below), his claim that 'what ought to be' is coextensive with all world-making has 
something of the same effect as Whitehead's rather more blunt assertion - which I 
cited earlier in this chapter - that 'realization is in itself the attainment of value'. Both 
serve to extend the question of value to every aspect of the world/'worlding' (directly, 
in Whitehead's case, and more indirectly, via an extension of ethics, in Latour's). 
Whitehead's position is undoubtedly somewhat problematic however, insofar as 
endurance itself - the sheer existence of a thing - is not an especially desirable basis 
for ethics. In Whitehead's schema, an actual entity will never fail to fulfil its 
obligation to produce itself and its own values, even though these values are not 
necessarily to be valued. It is for this reason, Stengers argues, that: 
 
specialists of human sciences who take advantage of the endurance of what 
they describe in order to claim resemblance with the lawful objects of natural 
sciences are doing a bad job. Each time they use their knowledge in order to 
claim that they know what humans and human societies may or may not 
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achieve, they contribute to give to what exists the power over what could be 
(Stengers 1999: 204). 
 
Stengers is drawing attention here to a distinction between what can be known in and 
of the world, and what the world could potentially be, a 'could' that can only, or at 
best, be imagined. I want to suggest that Latour's and Whitehead's 'answers' to the 
problems they raise by way of their extension of value to process lies here, in domains 
that pertain to the issue of 'could …' - but also that their different conceptions of such 
a domain are suggestive of rather different ethical projects. I begin with Latour, and 
with the specific role that he ascribes to moralists6 in the task of world-making.  
 
The role of the moralist in Latour's new constitution is a particularly interesting one: 
it is 'to recognize that the collective is always a dangerous artifice' (Latour 2004b: 
157), to recognize, that is, that the realisation of things that hold an essential place, 
the work of what Latour calls 'internalization', is also always a work of 
'externalization'. The notion of exteriority - of what is excluded, or externalized - is an 
important one with regards to Latour's challenge to the concept of nature as 'stupid 
matters of fact' which surround society (Latour 2004b: 124). In place of the 
nature/society bifurcation, Latour suggests there is 'a collective producing a 
distinction between what it has internalized and what it has externalized' (Latour 
2004b: 124). The entities that have been externalised, Latour reminds his reader, 'can 
be humans, but also animal species, research programs, concepts' - indeed they can 
be any rejected proposition at all (Latour 2004b: 124). These rejected propositions 
represent something of a 'danger' since they might at any moment knock at the door 
of the good common world and, in demanding to be taken into account, not only 
modify the 'inside' but also, necessarily, invoke a new definition of the outside. The 
point here is that '[t]he outside is no longer fixed, no longer inert; it is no longer 
either a reserve or a court of appeal or a dumping ground, but it is what has 
constituted the object of an explicit procedure of externalization' (Latour 2004b: 
125). It is the task of the moralist to 'go looking for [these entities] outside the 
collective, in order to facilitate their reentry and accelerate their insertion' (Latour 
2004b: 157).  
 
It is tempting at this point to fold Latour into Whitehead and to suggest that the task 
of the moralist is to oblige others to be obliged to remember that 'every realization of 
value is the outcome of limitation' (Whitehead 1985: 116-117). For limitation, in 
Whitehead's metaphysics, is the price of becoming; specifically, becoming is enabled 
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by the exclusion - and here a new conceptual construction must be introduced - 'of 
the boundless wealth of alternative potentiality' (Whitehead 1938: 207-208). 
Potentiality, for Whitehead, is an important concept, the correlative of what is 'given': 
'[t]he meaning of "givenness",' he writes, 'is that what is "given" might not have been 
"given"; and that what is not "given" might have been "given"' (Whitehead 1978: 44). 
Thus while concrete facts are for Whitehead the only reasons - which means that 
there can be nothing which is external to them that could possibly account for them 
(such as 'society') - they are not wholly given. Some parallels might be drawn here 
then, between Latour's concept of exteriority and Whitehead's potentiality. Both refer 
to an excluded exterior. Indeed Adrian Mackenzie notes that in some of Latour's 
earlier work the concept of the collective is understood to be 'the outcome of an event 
in which some element of the pre-individual reserve associated with individuated 
beings in a domain is singularly structured. In this event, both the individuated 
beings (subjects, objects, assemblages) and the collective itself become something 
different' (Mackenzie 2005: 14). 
 
Despite these similarities (which Mackenzie also goes on to question), for me the 
crucial distinction between Latour's and Whitehead's work on this point concerns 
their relation to what it is or is not possible to know of that excluded dimension. I 
cited Stengers earlier, who suggests that for Whitehead nature refers not just to 'what 
we perceive and can identify, but [to] the whole indefinite complexity of what we are 
aware of, even if we have no words to name it' (Stengers 1999: 197, my emphasis). 
This is a crucial point, and I would want to underscore its relation to potentiality, the 
defining characteristic of which is that it cannot, by definition, be grasped in thought: 
'by the nature of the case', Whitehead writes, 'you have abstracted from the 
remainder of things. In so far as the excluded things are important in your 
experience, your modes of thought are not fitted to deal with them' (Whitehead 1985: 
73). It is precisely Latour's suggestion that moralists should go looking for excluded 
entities (which implies that something 'exists' that could be 'found'), indeed his 
willingness to offer examples of the entities that are located in the exterior (such as 
the eight thousand lives lost per year in France to speeding cars), which indicates, I 
think, its difference from the concept of potentiality. Latour's concrete examples 
make it hard not to conclude that the outside to which he refers is not so much an 
exterior as a neglected interior.7 Mackenzie's critical point, that science studies 
scholars have historically laid too much emphasis on 'social relations that could be 
rationally understood, and explicated' (Mackenzie 2005: 3), is relevant here also. 
'Social structure', Mackenzie writes, 'does not exhaust the potentials of collective life' 
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(Mackenzie 2005: 13). Not entirely dissimilarly, I would argue that Latour's examples 
point to a curious emphasis on what is already present in the world, on what can be 
known and what can be found, and on what is already able to be imagined.  
 
Perhaps this should come as no surprise, since it is, ultimately, a politics of reality to 
which Latour is referring:  
 
Thanks to the moralists, every set has its complementary counterpart that 
comes to haunt it, every collective has its worry, every interior has a reminder 
of the artifice by which means of which it was designed. There exists a 
Realpolitik, perhaps, but there is also a politics of reality: while the former is 
said to exclude moral preoccupations, the latter is nourished by them (Latour, 
2004b: 160). 
 
Although I welcome the way that Latour seeks to revisit the question of value (and in 
doing so, to rehabilitate moralists), I want to propose that it is worth extending his 
politics of reality to a politics of virtual reality in order to attend to more than the 
processes - of exclusion and inclusion, externalization and internalization - by which 
things come into existence. Latour's point is that matters of concern, or Things, exist 
and maintain the sturdiness of their existence by way of the gathering together of 
participants, ingredients, humans and nonhumans that are not necessarily physically 
or conceptually present in a specific spatio-temporal situation. By recognising this 
point, and by launching 'a multifarious inquiry … with the tools of anthropology, 
philosophy, metaphysics, history, sociology to detect how many participants are 
gathered in a thing', critique, Latour argues, will no longer be confined to 'a flight into 
the conditions of possibility of a given matter of fact' (Latour 2004a: 246 and 245). 
Latour considers such matters to be 'simply a gathering that has failed - a fact that 
has not been assembled according to due process' (Latour 2004a: 246). One might 
ask, however, where critique might be led if due process referred not only to actual 
but also to virtual processes; if the critic was obliged to attend not only to those 
entities that are physically or conceptually present somewhere (just not here), but to 
virtual multiciplicities or singularities that have no corporeal presence at all. In other 
words, rather than focus solely, as Manuel DeLanda puts it, 'on the final product, or 
at best on the process of actualization but always in the direction of the final product', 
one might also (or, DeLanda argues, one might instead) 'move in the opposite 
direction: from qualities and extensities to the intensive processes which produce 
them, and from there to the virtual' (DeLanda 2002: 67-68).  
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 My intentions in what follows are not to 'correct' Latour, and it is certainly not to do 
so by using the technical details of Whitehead's work as a primer in this task. 
Nevertheless there is a richness in Whitehead's concepts and writing, as I suggested 
earlier, which acts as invitation - or as Stengers might put it, which functions as a lure 
(Stengers 2004) - to take up some his concepts and to explore where they might lead. 
It is notable that the concept of potentiality is one that Latour neglects, and yet it is 
here in particular that I find a provocation to ethics - specifically, to an ethics that is 
wedded to the virtual. This dimension of Whitehead's work was of special interest to 
Deleuze, and so it is with his reading - or more accurately, his inhabitation - of 
Whitehead that I begin.    
 
Value, ethics 
In his chapter 'What is an event?' in The Fold, Deleuze describes Whitehead's eternal 
objects - arguably his most developed concept of potentiality - as the 'last component 
of Whitehead's definition of the event' (Deleuze 2003: 79). A prehension, Deleuze 
writes, 'does not grasp other prehensions without apprehending eternal objects' 
(Deleuze 2003: 79). Eternal objects are 'pure Virtualities that are actualized in 
prehensions' (Deleuze 2003: 79), or as Whitehead puts it, 'the pure potentials of the 
universe' (Whitehead 1978: 149). The concept of eternal objects has a significant role 
to play in Whitehead's project, which is in part to return to nature the value (aesthetic 
value, for example) that he considers modern science to have misplaced. Eternal 
objects do some of this work inasmuch as they enable Whitehead to account for 
qualities and intensities without casting these as 'secondary'. This is because, with 
their physical ingression into an actual occasion, eternal objects become an actual 
and un-detachable property of a thing, defining it in its particularity. An eternal 
object, Deleuze writes, 'can thus cease becoming incarnate, just as new things - a new 
shade of colour, or a new figure - can finally find their conditions' (Deleuze 2003: 
80). As the name suggests, eternal objects come close to being universals - 'though 
not quite', Whitehead adds (Whitehead 1978: 48). Not quite, because it is precisely 
through the 'realization' of eternal objects that actual entities differ from each 
another. Deleuze develops this point in The Logic of Sense8 in relation to the 
infinitive verb, which he identifies as having two dimensions: on the one hand it is 
virtual and incorporeal, it is a potentiality or becoming, while on the other hand it 
indicates a substantive relation to a 'state of affairs' which takes place in a physical 
time characterised by succession. Thus Deleuze writes of 'the verb "to green," distinct 
from the tree and its greenness, the verb "to eat" … distinct from food and its 
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consumable qualities, or the verb "to mate" distinct from bodies and their sexes' 
(Deleuze 2004: 221).  
 
Whitehead is of particular interest to Deleuze because he rejected substance as the 
basic metaphysical category, choosing instead to privilege continuity. As the 
discussion of the becoming of continuity earlier indicated however, this is not the 
continuity of rectilinear tracks or of lines that could dissolve into independent points 
but of an infinite series of actual entities or coalitions of prehensions. Contra the 
oppositions between the figure of the sovereign subject and the inert object, between 
organic and inorganic matter, Deleuze too emphasises continuous movement and 
activity, the constant enfolding, unfolding, and refolding of matter, time and space. 
'The unit of matter, the smallest element of the labyrinth, is the fold, not the point' 
(Deleuze 2003: 6). In arguing thus, Deleuze poses a challenge to any philosophy that 
rests on a distinction between the knowing subject and the object for knowledge. In 
Deleuze's 'objectless knowledge' (Badiou 1994: 67) the object refers not to a 
spatialised relation of form-matter, but to a temporal modulation, a variation, in a 
continuum. Correlatively, the subject, which also represents variation, is a 'point of 
view'. This does not mean that the subject 'has' a point of view (which would imply a 
pre-given subject), or that the truth varies from subject to subject (which would imply 
that the truth is relative), but rather that the point of view is 'the condition in which 
the truth of a variation appears to the subject' (Deleuze 2003: 20).  
 
The concept of the event is especially important in the context of Deleuze's emphasis 
on continuity. As Alain Badiou explains, the event is what enables Deleuze to account 
for singularity, it is 'what singularizes continuity in each of its local folds' (Badiou 
1994: 56).9 In this respect an event is always 'present' in a situation, at least in its 
virtual dimension. This is not to suggest that it is the cause of that situation however, 
or that it precedes it as such, or that it should be thought of in terms of an original or 
model. On the contrary, the infinite number of contingencies that are introduced in 
processes of becoming ensure that a concrete fact does not amount to a realisation of 
'something that already existed in a nascent state' (Ansell Pearson 1999: 38). Insofar 
as the world maintains the power of virtuality, it also therefore maintains the capacity 
to become differently. Able to be actualised in multiple ways (which is another way of 
saying that an event is not bound to a particular space and time, but may be 
experienced whenever and wherever it is actualised anew), an event retains an 
openness to re-inventions (or re-eventalisations). It is the inexhaustible reserve or 
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excess that produces novelty. As Deleuze notes, the eternality of eternal objects 'is not 
opposed to creativity' (Deleuze 2003: 79).  
 
Deleuze's concept of the event is especially useful insofar as it displaces the 
habituated notion that everything that is 'realized' (in Whitehead's terms) in a 
particular situation must be explained solely with reference to the participants in that 
situation. Against the mechanistic notions of cause and effect that underpin many 
scientific conceptions of the world, this is a notion of 'causation' in which what 
happens in a particular context cannot be explained or accounted for solely by it, or 
by the physical entities that compose it, nor can it be reduced to it. If one were to 
liken, for example, the qualities of subjectivity and objectivity to (a complex of) 
eternal objects, then these qualities would be understood to be both inside and 
outside the experiment, both 'universal' and particular, abstract and concrete.10 
Indeed, bearing in mind the relation between universality and particularity that the 
concept of eternal objects raises, or that is raised by the relation between the virtual 
and the actual, one might argue, as Whitehead does, that '[w]e are in the world, and 
the world is in us' (Whitehead 1938: 227). What is important here, however, is that 
the world to which Whitehead refers includes a 'virtual' dimension. As such, the 
notion that 'we are in the world' (and vice versa) must be distinguished from Latour's 
ostensibly similar claim that, were we to give him 'one matter of concern', he would 
be able to show us 'the whole earth and heavens that have to be gathered to hold it 
firmly in place' (Latour 2004a: 246).  
 
Although Whitehead's claim that 'realisation is in itself the attainment of value' and 
Latour's claim that world-marking is co-extensive with 'what ought to be done' seem, 
at first glance, to have something of the same effect - both extend questions of value, 
directly or indirectly, to process - in fact they give rise to rather important differences 
with regards to ethics. While Latour's argument in Politics of Nature undoubtedly 
addresses itself to key ethical issues (such as the relations between facts and values, 
and the task of moralists), in the end, ethics can hardly be distinguished from due 
process. If all praxis, all fabrication, is ethical, then it becomes difficult to understand 
what it might mean to think and act ethically, as opposed to what it might be to think 
and act at all. This is why the ascription of a specific role to moralists is one of the 
most confusing aspects of Latour's work in this area. Why is this necessary, if every 
question posed to the world, by whoever or whatever poses it, is always already 
ethical in character? Latour's answer - that moralists, in contrast to scientists, 
politicians and economists, do not have an investment in bringing closure to the 
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discussion as to what should be taken into account - is hardly inherent to the 
profession. Indeed, in view of the many controversies that surround those who work 
in this field, and the complex networks of power that are invested in the 
institutionalisation of ethics (and bioethics in particular), one might argue that there 
are others - artists, for example - who are far better qualified for the role, as its 
requirements are defined by Latour. 
 
It is difficult, in other words, to understand what the alignment of ethics and 
actualisation offers to the critic in practice. Without wishing to collapse Deleuze into 
Whitehead or vice versa, it is notable that for both, value - and this is the crucial point 
- does not pertain solely to processes of actualisation or to actual(ised) entities. This 
is the lesson of potentiality in Whitehead: that it is not abstractions in themselves, 
whether they are internalized or externalized, which are relevant to ethics, but rather 
the relation of those abstractions to unrealised potentialities, to 'the remainder of 
things', that abstractions necessarily exclude but whose significance cannot be 
refused. While it may be the case therefore that for Whitehead endurance is itself the 
attainment of value, value is not identical to that which endures. It is notable, for 
example, that Whitehead defines life not in terms of an enduring entity, or as the 
property of an enduring entity (an entity which could, say, judge and be judged) but 
rather as 'a bid for freedom' from the 'shackle' of inherited ancestry to which an entity 
binds its occasions (Whitehead 1978: 104). For Whitehead, life 'lurks in the 
interstices' (Whitehead 1978: 105), it is 'a novelty of definiteness' (Whitehead 1978: 
104), an alteration in value. This point is important because it provides a reason (a 
reason that is immanent to concrete fact) to develop a relation to the virtual, even if 
that relation is necessarily irreducible to it.  
 
Not entirely dissimilarly, Deleuze argues that the properly ethical task is to try to 
'ascend' to the virtual; 'to carry life to the state of non-personal power'; to 'carr[y] out 
the conjunction, the transmutation of fluxes, through which life escapes from the 
resentment of persons, societies and reigns' (Deleuze and Parnet 1987: 50). 
Evaluation, here, is not a question of judgement (defined in terms of pre-existing 
criteria) but is rather immanent to the mode of existence in question (Deleuze 1998: 
134-135). Or to put that differently: evaluation is evaluated by the extent to which it is 
'creative of life' (Deleuze and Parnet 1987: 50). This is the difference between 
understanding the singularity of an event in terms of the coming together of relations 
in unique configurations, and understanding it in terms of a becoming together, that 
is, in terms of the eliciting into being 'factors in the universe which antecedently to 
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that process exist only in the mode of unrealized potentialities' (Whitehead 1938: 
206-207). It is perhaps in this respect above all then, that Deleuze is distinguished 
from Whitehead, Stengers and Latour. For Deleuze, event is not solely a conceptual 
tool by which to critique mechanistic and reductionist understandings of the world 
(for instance). More than this, being equal to an event - willing an event in a way that 
involves neither resignation nor ressentiment, that is affirmative, and that transforms 
the quality of the will itself - is in itself an ethical task.11  
 
It would be reasonable to point out, here, that Deleuze's project is also - and perhaps 
more importantly - distinguished from Latour's insofar as the former is philosophical 
while the latter is largely, and in keeping with the social sciences more generally, 
empirical. While there is certainly some truth in this, I nevertheless want to suggest 
in the final and concluding section of this chapter that the use of the virtual, as a 
concept, does not necessarily represent a radical departure from core social science 
concerns and that, as a 'methodological orientation device', it might even contribute 
to the continued 'life' of empirical social research. Deleuze's analysis of the relations 
between problems and solutions will be important in this context, especially insofar 
as problems and solutions are understood, as Manual DeLanda argues they might be, 
as the epistemological counterpart of the ontological relation between the actual and 
the virtual.  
 
Problems, solutions 
As I noted earlier, one of the most important aspects of Isabelle Stengers' 
contribution to the philosophy of science has been her analysis of the grounds on 
which science is critiqued. In this context, Stengers has been especially sceptical of 
the sociological approach to science. To quote her again on this, in full: 'In saying that 
science is a social undertaking, doesn't one subordinate it to the categories of 
sociology? Now, sociology is a science, and in this case it is a science that is trying to 
become a superscience, the science that explains all others. But how could it escape 
the very disqualification it brings on the other sciences?' (Stengers 2000: 2-3). 
Latour, as I have illustrated, has taken this claim seriously and shown how analytic 
terms such as 'the social' and 'the natural' may be used not to explain so much as to 
explain away the very facts that researchers have sought to get closer to. Although 
science studies scholars have generally been slow to apply the implications of their 
analyses to social theory, it is arguable that the 'mistaking [of] the analytical tool for 
the reality' (Haraway 1991: 143) often characterises social science more broadly.  
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Consider, for example, a classic sociological text, The Sociological Imagination 
([1959] 2000). Although C. Wright Mills claims in this book that 'no one is "outside 
society"', he nevertheless suggests that the sociologist is distinguished from 'the 
ordinary man' (Mills 2000: 184) insofar as he or she is uniquely positioned to make 
visible - that is, to make relevant - the relations between the individual's experience 
that is here and now, and structures and forces (capitalism, power, patriarchy) which 
are not necessarily visible in themselves. For Mills, the sociological problem is the 
bridge between these two domains, between history and biography, and it is in 
formulating the problem that the sociological imagination realises its full potential. 
This bridging, or making the connection, is, for Mills, transformative: it transforms 
the ordinary man's experience of his own experience. One of the problems with 'the 
sociological problem' however, as it is cast by Mills, is that it takes historical social 
structures on the one hand and some variation of the subject on the other as given. 
These givens are abstractions, as Whitehead would put it; they are the fruit of 
sociology not only as a discipline, but also as a profession. One might speculate, 
therefore, that 'making the connection' between them is important not solely because 
it illustrates the relevance of history to biography, but because the activity of 
connecting makes sociology relevant to itself (to its own abstractions). Understood in 
this way, the sociological problem is its own solution: it transforms ordinary 
experience into sociological experience.  
 
This is perhaps not surprising: as I discussed earlier, an enduring entity will never fail 
to produce its own values, whether they are of value or not. And it is also not 
necessarily problematic: if sociology is indeed a science, as Stengers pointedly 
implies, then one might confer on the discipline the respect that the singularity of any 
scientific endeavour deserves, that is, for inventing scientific objects under the 
strictest conditions. The 'post-constructivist' claim, that the concepts and methods 
deployed by social scientists are productive of the very object they seek to investigate, 
comes close - albeit with very different intentions - to confirming this view (see for 
example Law and Urry 2003). I say 'with very different intentions' because although 
the aim of many of these arguments is to draw attention to the limits of social science 
and to demand, as is often demanded of the natural sciences, that researchers 
recognise the specificity of their objects (results, products, outcomes), it is also, 
simultaneously, and perhaps in contradiction, to extend its ambitions. For unlike the 
'ideal' of the natural sciences, the social sciences often come with an explicit 
aspiration to be relevant, even to make a difference, to something other than itself. 
The tensions that I am describing here are witnessed in John Law and John Urry's 
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article, 'Enacting the Social' (a title which neatly captures their post-constructivist 
point):  
 
In a world where everything is performative, everything has consequences, 
there is, as Donna Haraway indicates, no innocence. And if this is right then 
two questions arise: what realities do the current methods of social science 
help to enact or erode? And what realities might they help to bring into being 
or strengthen? (Law and Urry 2003: 5, footnotes omitted). 
 
It is in this context - in the context of the delicate balancing act between, on the one 
hand, recognising the role that social scientists play in creating the worlds they seek 
to investigate and, on the other, wishing to change worlds that include more than 
social scientists and their objects alone - that the concept of the virtual is of value. 
Specifically, it is of value as a tool or a technique which might orient the social 
researcher towards, as Whitehead puts it and as I cited earlier, that which is not given 
and that which might have been given; towards that which is not already known or 
even imagined; towards 'the whole indefinite complexity', to quote Stengers once 
again on this point, 'of what we are aware of, even if we have no words to name it'. In 
order to explicate this point, I want to consider what a social research project might 
look like if its basic commitments were not to historical social structures and the 
subject but to the virtual and the actual. And what Mills' sociological problem might 
look like, if it were refracted through the virtual problem. 
 
Minimally defined as a dimension of the actual that is neither observable nor 
accessible in itself, the virtual offers a 'beyond' actual states of affairs for the social 
scientist to look to. This is important, I think, because the explication of what is not 
immediately, or indeed ever, accessible is how much of the 'magic' of sociology is 
generated, as Mills passionately (if somewhat polemically) illustrates. Unlike Mills' 
social structures however, virtual structures or patterns cannot do 'explanatory work' 
because they are not determining in the way that social forces, or the material 
sedimentation of such forces over time, are often understood to be in sociology.12 
Virtual structures are not determining not because the virtual has no relation to the 
actual (it is not an unintelligible outside), but because processes of actualisation 
introduce many contingent divergences. In practice, this means that the question as 
to whether something is (going to be) important or relevant in a piece of social 
research cannot be decided in advance. Indeed, the incommensurability of the 
relation between the virtual and the actual actively mitigates against this and 
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arguably institutes an openness with regards to the question of what is and is not of 
value. 
 
Deleuze's analysis of the relations between problems and solutions is informed by 
many of the conceptual themes that I have already introduced. As Philip Goodchild 
explains, for Deleuze, '[i]n the same way that events are different from the states of 
affairs in which they are actualized, problems are different from the solutions which 
they produce within thought' (Goodchild 1996: 54). '[T]he problem of "light"', Claire 
Colebrook writes, 'is posed, creatively, by different forms of life in different ways: 
photosynthesis for plants, the eye for animal organisms, colour for the artist' 
(Colebrook 2002: 21). As this example illustrates, there is no 'true' solution to a 
problem (although there are true problems). Photosynthesis, the eye, and colour 
might have the problem of light in common, but their ancestry, or rather, the 
distribution of the singularities that determine them as solutions, are clearly 
different. The best - and this is indeed the best, in value-terms - that a solution can do 
is to develop a problem. 'It seems', Deleuze writes, 'that a problem always finds the 
solution it merits, according to the conditions which define it as a problem' (Deleuze 
2004: 65).  The obligation here, then, is not to solve a problem (or to explain it away), 
but rather to try to enable it to 'speak', as it were, or to pose it in terms which enable 
it to play itself out in productively inventive and creative ways. When the problem 
(rather than the social scientist, and rather than the 'ordinary man') is enabled to 
make things that cannot be identified in advance relevant to each other, both the 
social scientist and the 'ordinary man' are likely to be transformed.  
 
There is a tendency with event-thinkers to focus on remarkable points, and on the 
creative aspects of an event, to argue, for instance, that regardless of the rhetoric of 
reductionism that may take hold of an experimental event, an event will always imply 
'something excessive in relation to its actualization, something that overthrows 
worlds, individuals and persons' (Deleuze in Halewood 2003: 241). As I have 
suggested throughout, an event is irreducible to the concrete facts that are actualised 
in process and in this respect there will inevitably be in any actualisation a dimension 
of creativity and novelty. Nevertheless, while it is possible to discern ancestries that 
differenciate13 the virtual in inventive and creative ways - and in these instances a 
problem 'is a way of creating a future' (Colebrook 2002: 1) - Whitehead also reminds 
his reader, as I noted briefly earlier, of the shackle or burden of inherited ancestries, 
ancestries for which 'the uniformity along the historic route increases the degree of 
conformity which that route exacts from the future. In particular each historic route 
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of like occasions tends to prolong itself, by reason of the weight of uniform 
inheritance derivable from its members' (Whitehead 1978: 56).14 One might apply 
this point to disciplinary abstractions and to the inheritances that serve to limit what 
a discipline can or cannot become. As I noted earlier in this chapter, this issue was of 
considerable concern to Whitehead. His intentions in developing a speculative 
metaphysics were, precisely, to produce both 'a restraint upon specialists, and also … 
an enlargement of their imaginations' (Whitehead 1978: 17). There are many ways to 
do this. One of them might be to pursue the 'minor history' of sociology, which, as 
Wolf Lepenies (1992) illustrates, is literary rather than scientific. In this light of this 
history it is perhaps no accident that Mills, who was evidently preoccupied in The 
Sociological Imagination by the high price of the professionalisation of the social 
sciences, should argue that the sociological imagination is as likely to be possessed by 
'literary men and historians' as it is by 'professional' sociologists, or that his 
appendix, 'On Intellectual Craftmanship', should read like an essay on the practice of 
creative writing.  
 
I have chosen to foreground the concept of the virtual which is also commonly linked 
to the vitality of creativity. I do not think, however, that 'pursuing' the virtual - 
making a real difference, producing a variation in value - is an easy task. There is a 
difference, as Stengers puts it, between sophisticated observation and an event. Or as 
Deleuze writes, 'what is … frequently found - and worse - are nonsensical sentences, 
remarks without interest or importance, banalities mistaken for profundities, 
ordinary "points" confused with singular points, badly posed or distorted problems - 
all heavy with dangers, yet the fate of us all' (Deleuze 2004: 191). At the very least, 
then, the virtual serves as a reminder that not all experiments, not all assemblages, 
not all gatherings, develop a problem that is worth trying to extract from actuality. 
Not all actualisations are, in themselves, ethical. And articulating a sociological 
problem is not in itself necessarily the agent of transformation or the mark of novelty. 
To redistribute the singularities that determine a solution is to truly transform an 
event. While such transformations are undoubtedly rare, the aspiration towards them 
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1 'What this means is that a large number of different trajectories … may end up in exactly the 
same final state (the attractor), as long as all of them begin somewhere within the "sphere of 
influence"' (DeLanda 2002: 15). 
2 In this respect event thinking is a protest against the notion that time is an ordered 
succession of instants without duration and that space is a system of points without 
extension. 
3 This point is indebted to the numerous conversations I have had with Andrew Barry on this 
subject.  
4 This is relevant to my earlier discussion of primary and secondary qualities because it 
accounts for what are perceived to be some of the most significant 'fictions' to have been 
created about nature: the fictions that stem from the subjectivity of the human senses. Like 
other modern natural philosophers, Galileo distinguishes between 'qualities absolute and 
fixed, which form the object of mathematical analysis, and qualities subjective and in flux, 
which derive from the constitution of the observer' (Proctor 1991: 54). While the former alone 
are real, necessary, and essential to knowledge of an object, the latter are spurious 
distortions. And herein, in the recognition of the subjectivity of the observer, lies the 
significance of experimentation, for the experimental method is cast as an important - if not 
the most important - technique for eliminating bias and appearance, and for gaining access to 
the essence of things. 
5 Consider in this context Latour's claim that 'the stock drawn upon before the experimental 
event is not the same as the stock drawn upon after it' (Latour 1999: 126). 
6 This is a somewhat controversial term, as is the notion of 'ethicist' in contemporary science 
and especially biomedicine. It would be interesting to address the question as to what name 
might be given to the group of people who undertake the 'moralists' task' (see below) as 
Latour understands it, but this is beyond the scope of this chapter.  
7 My thanks to Michael Parker for encapsulating this point so elegantly and, in so doing, 
helping me to better understand the implications of it. 
8 Which Paul Patton suggests 'might equally have been entitled "The Logic of the Event"' 
(Patton 1996: 13). 
9 Which is precisely Badiou's problem. The event, understood by Deleuze as that which 
emerges out of an ontological univocity, is too much of the world, is so much a part of the 
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world, in fact, that Badiou feels obliged to call its singularity into question: how is it possible to 
distinguish an event from a fact if 'everything is event'? (Badiou 1994: 56). Deleuze's concept 
of the fold is so profoundly antiextensional, Badiou argues, so labyrinthine and directly 
qualitative, that he unable to account for the singularity of an event or rupture at all.  
10 For a detailed illustration of this point, in the context of an analysis of early experiments on 
serotonin, see Fraser (2003). 
11 In arguing thus, Deleuze owes as much to Neitzsche as he does to the Stoics. Indeed 
Philip Goodchild suggests that the eternal return should be understood 'not [as] a theory of 
time, but [as] a technique for living the event' (Goodchild 1996: 53). 
12 'The reality of the virtual is structure. We must avoid giving the elements and relations that 
form a structure an actuality which they do not have, and withdrawing them from a reality 
which they have' (Deleuze in DeLanda 2006: 246). 
13 In Deleuze's work, differenciate, with a c, refers to processes that relate to the virtual, while 
differentiate refers to processes that relate to the actual. 
14 Technically speaking, Whitehead is makes this claim on the basis of his distinction between 
pure potentiality and real potentiality. Philip Rose explains the difference thus: 'Pure 
potentiality is an aspect of the "mere" continuum while real potentiality is an aspect of the 
"real" continuum. … Where the mere continuum includes the entire spectrum of potentiality, 
the real or extensive continuum represents the general field of real potentiality, that is, the 
field of objectified or Past Actual Occasions (and their relations)' (Rose 2002: 50-51). This is 
essentially how all actual entities must be understood following the cessation of immediacy or 
concresence. Having 'passed away' or 'perished' as Whitehead puts it, the actual entity 
functions as a resource or, more accurately, as the real potential for the becomings of 
subsequent actualities: 'The pragmatic use of the actual entity, constituting its static life, lies in 
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